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This paper introduces a connectionist Agent-Based Model (cABM) that incorporates detailed, micro-
level understanding of social influence processes derived from laboratory studies and that aims to 
contextualize these processes in such a way that it becomes possible to model multidirectional, dy-
namic influences in extended social networks.  At the micro-level, agent processes are simulated by 
recurrent auto-associative networks, an architecture that has a proven ability to simulate a variety of 
individual psychological and memory processes [1].  At the macro-level, these individual networks 
are combined into a “community of networks” so that they can exchange their individual infor-
mation with each other by transmitting information on the same concepts from one net to another. 
This essentially creates a network structure that reflects a social system in which (a collection of) 
nodes represent individual agents and the links between agents the mutual social influences that 
connect them [2]. The network structure itself is dynamic and shaped by the interactions between the 
individual agents through simple processes of social adaptation.  Through simulations, the cABM 
generates a number of novel predictions that broadly address three main issues: (1) the consequences 
of the interaction between multiple sources and targets of social influence (2) the dynamic develop-
ment of social influence over time and (3) collective and individual opinion trajectories over time.  
Some of the predictions regarding individual level processes have been tested and confirmed in la-
boratory experiments. In a extensive research program, data is currently being collected from real 
groups that will allow validating the predictions of cABM regarding aggregate outcomes. 
Keywords: social influence, connectionism, agent-based modeling, social psychology. 
1. Introduction 
The study of social influence seems to have developed along two parallel, but largely 
independent lines of research.  On the one hand, research in sociology and physics has 
focused on the macro-level, by studying dynamics of opinion flow within extended social 
influence networks and using aggregate-level variables (i.e., the proportion of a popula-
tion in a particular state), with little regard for individual psychological processes work-
ing at the micro-level.  On the other hand, social psychological research has focussed on 
individual psychological processes that underlie people’s judgements and behaviors in 
carefully crafted laboratory experiments, without much consideration of the social con-
texts or networks in which these processes operate.  However, it is clear that group-level 
outcomes of theoretical assumptions about intra-individual and inter-individual processes 
are rarely obvious, and also that individual processes often interact over time to create 
complex systems with non-intuitive, emergent properties [3, 4].  A number of authors [5, 
6] have therefore argued that in order to develop a full understanding of the nature of 
social influence, theories or models need to be constructed that take into account varia-
bles on both the individual and aggregate level of social systems.   
 
A potential method to achieve this is the use of agent-based modeling (ABM).  In gen-
eral, ABM build social structures from the “bottom-up”, by simulating individuals with 
virtual agents and stipulating rules that govern interactions among these agents. Creating 
computational models of social units (e.g. individuals, social groups, organizations or 
even nations) and their interactions, and observing the global structures that these interac-
tions produce, has proven to provide unique insights into group phenomena.  They ex-
press in clear mathematical and computational terms, how complex social structures 
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emerge from interactions of individual agents at various distinct levels, allowing the 
analysis of properties of individual agents (e.g. their attributes and interactions), and the 
emergent group-level behavior.  However, human social groups change not only through 
structural adaptations (i.e. social organization), but also by guiding and restructuring the 
behaviors and cognitions of the individuals that form them.  To that extent, several mod-
elers [7, 8] have argued that ABM needs to incorporate relatively sophisticated models of 
individual agents, to allow them to adapt and change their behavior over time.   
 
In this paper, an ABM is introduced that aims at accomplishing this by implementing 
self-categorization processes into a recurrent, connectionist agent model.  I hope to illus-
trate how the use of a valid, social psychological theory of agent heuristics can contribute 
to a better understanding of social complex phenomena at the macro level.  First, the 
model is used to simulate a number of key empirical patterns form the self-categorization 
literature.  Subsequently, the predictions of the model are tested in an empirical study, in 
which the emergence of shared social categories from inter and intra personal processes 
was investigated. And finally, the cABM is compared to similar models, and it is dis-
cussed how it can be used to further explore the interaction between the individual and 
aggregate levels of social systems. 
2. Personal and social self 
Social identity theory (SIT) and self-categorization theory (SCT) play a central role in 
social psychological research, and have contributed in a significant way to our under-
standing of the relationship between the individual and society. A central insight from 
this work is that individuals cognitively represent themselves in the form of self-
categorizations, grouping the self and some individuals as equivalent, in contrast to other 
individuals. When self-categorization occurs at a group level, the social self or social 
identity is said to be salient, and the self is assimilated to other ingroup members – 
groups with which an individual identifies - and at the same time differentiated from out-
group members [9]. This cognitive redeﬁnition of the self is called depersonalization, or 
self-stereotyping in terms of an ingroup stereotype. A consequence is that individuals 
perceive and act in terms of their social self, rather than in terms of their personal self 
[10]. Importantly, the term social self does not necessarily refer to demographic, socio-
logical or role groups (e.g., women, those with low socio-economic status, or teachers).  
The term refers to psychological groups where an individual defines him- or herself as 
being a member because the group is self-relevant and self-defining.  When people de-
personalize, the norms, values and beliefs that define the ingroup(s) are internalized and 
influence the attitudes and behavior of group members. As such, depersonalization is 
seen as the main precursor to group phenomena, most notably social influence [11].  It is 
through depersonalization that social influence becomes possible, and group processes 
can impact on the psychology of individual members.  It results in a motivation to act in 
ways that advance the group’s collective interests and goals and to ensure that one’s own 
ingroup is positively distinct from other (out)groups. Because other ingroup members are 
viewed as similar to oneself, they become a valid source of information and a testing 
ground for one’s own views on relevant dimensions.  One’s beliefs, theories and 
knowledge about the world and oneself are developed and validated or changed through 
interactions with those that are categorized as being similar to oneself. 
Given its central importance, it can be argued that a more thorough understanding of 
self-categorization in terms of a personal or social self will promote our understanding of 
social influence processes. It is suggested here that the implementation of self-
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categorization into a connectionist ABM (or cABM) can provide an important impetus in 
that process, in two major ways. First, it can provide a more detailed, cognitive agent-
model of individual self-categorization processes then is currently available. Secondly, 
most of our knowledge on self-categorization comes from laboratory studies, in which 
social influence is manipulated and analyzed at the level of individual cognitive process-
es. However, as pointed out by a number of authors (see [12]), simple, individual pro-
cesses often combine to create complex systems with nonintuitive emergent properties 
when they are iterated across time and space. A cABM of self-categorization allows ex-
ploring such emergent properties in more detail than current, mostly verbal theories and 
models, for instance by generating detailed predictions about the dynamic development 
of reciprocal social influences within networks agents. 
3. The connectionist agent-based model (cABM) 
Connectionism is an approach in the fields of artificial intelligence, psychology, neuro-
science and philosophy of mind, that models mental or behavioral phenomena as the 
emergent processes of interconnected networks of simple units. Connectionist architec-
tures and processing mechanisms are based on analogies with properties of the human 
brain, in which learning is conceptualized as a process of on-line adaptation of existing 
knowledge to novel information provided by the environment. The focus in this paper 
will be on the recurrent auto-associator [13, 14], a model that has been applied success-
fully to group biases, causal attribution & person and group impression in social psychol-
ogy  [1, 15]. 
3.1. Recurrent auto-associator 
A recurrent network has three distinctive features (Figure 1, panel c).  First, all units 
within an individual agent network are interconnected, such that all units send out and 
receive activation.  Second, information is represented by external activation, which is 
 
 
Fig. 1. The left panel (a) shows the transmission of information from a talking to a listening agent.  The middle panel 
(b) shows a group of 4 agents. The right panel (c) shows a standard recurrent network representing a single agent.  
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automatically spread among all interconnected units within an agent in proportion to the 
weights of their connections. The activation coming from the other units within an agent 
is called the internal activation. Typically, activations and weights have lower and upper 
bounds of approximately –1 and +1. And thirdly, short-term activations are stored in 
long-term weight changes of the connections. 
 
In a recurrent network, processing information takes place in two phases. During the first 
phase, each unit in the network receives activation from external sources. Because the 
units are interconnected, this activation is automatically spread throughout the network in 
proportion to the weights of the connections to the other units. The activation coming 
from the other units is called the internal activation (for each unit, it is calculated by 
summing all activations arriving at that unit). Together with the external activation, this 
internal activation determines the final pattern of activation of the units (termed the net 
activation), which reflects the short-term memory of the network. In the linear version of 
activation spreading in the recurrent network that is used here, the final activation is the 
linear sum of the external and internal input after a single updating cycle through the 
network. In nonlinear versions used by other researchers (see for instance [13]), the final 
activation is determined by a nonlinear combination of external and internal inputs up-
dated during a number of internal cycles (for mathematical details, see [14]). Previous 
simulations by Van Rooy and colleagues revealed that the linear version with a single 
internal cycle reproduced observed data at least as well, suggesting that the present linear 
activation update algorithm with a single internal cycle is sufficient for simulating many 
phenomena in group judgments (see for instance Table 6 in [1]). 
The net activation of a unit is determined by the sum of the external and internal acti-
vations, after one updating cycle through the network. More specifically, every unit i in 
the network receives external activation, termed exti, in proportion to an excitation pa-
rameter E which reflects how much the activation is excited, or  
This activation subsequently spreads through the auto-associative network, meaning eve-
ry unit i receives internal activation inti, which is the sum of the activation from the other 
units j (denoted by aj) in proportion to the weight of their connection to unit i, or 





The updating of activation at each cycle is governed by the following equation [14]: 
where D reflects a memory decay term. As in previous simulations [1], parameter values 
were set to D= E= 1. Hence, the final activation of unit equals the sum of the external 







After activation has been determined, the recurrent model enters the second learning 
phase in which the short-term activations are stored in long-term weight changes of the 
connections. Basically, these weight changes are driven by the difference between the 
internal activation received from other units in the network and the external activation 
received from outside sources. This difference, also called the error, is reduced in propor-
tion to the learning rate that determines how fast the network changes its weights and 
learns. This error-reducing mechanism is known as the delta algorithm [14].  In mathe-
matical terms, the delta algorithm strives to match the internal predictions of the network 
inti as closely as possible to the actual state of the external environment exti and stores 
this information in the connection weights. This error-reducing process is formally ex-




where ∆wji is the change in the weight of the connection from unit j to i, and ε is a learn-
ing rate that determines how fast the network learns. An implication of this learning algo-
rithm is that when an object and its feature co-occur frequently, then their connection 
weight gradually increases to eventually reach an asymptotic value of +1.  
3.2. Socially distributed network & communication 
A number of authors have illustrated how auto-associative networks can be naturally ex-
tended to allow communication between them (see [2, 16]).  It basically involves creating 
an agent-based model such that individual recurrent networks or agents are linked in an 
adaptive network structure.  Any agent can (in principle) interact with any other agent, 
but the impact of the interaction will adapt to experience. Different adaptation rules have 
been used in previous simulations, to explore the impact of trust on communication [16] 
and persuasiveness of information on the development of knowledge structures [2].  In 
the current simulation, communication involves the transmission of information from one 
agent's network to another, along connections whose adaptive weights reflect the mutual 
social influence between agents (see Figure 1, panel a).  During a simulated interaction, 
listening agents compare their information (as represented by internal activation of their 
own network) with the information they receive from talking agents (represented by the 
external activation received from talking agents). The stronger the connection between 
agents, the more influence they have on each other.  As such, a group of agents functions 
as an adaptive, socially distributed network in which information and knowledge are dis-
tributed among and propagated in function of the social influence between different indi-
vidual networks. The listening agent sums all information received from other talking 
agents in proportion to the inter-agent weights, and then processes this information inter-
nally (according to the standard recurrent approach). Or, in mathematical terms: 
where ext_al represents the external activation received by the listening agent l; wkl is 
the inter-agent weight from the talking agent k to the listening agent l; and ai denotes the 
final activation (which combines the external and internal activation received) expressed 




3.3. Social adaptation 
An important aspect of the cABM is that the structure in which the agents are situated 
is adapted through the interaction of the agents themselves.  Whenever agents interact, 
the listening agent compares its own internal beliefs concerning an issue with the attitude 
expressed by a talking agent on that same issue. Inter-agent weights are then updated 
driven by the error between the external information, representing the attitude expressed 
by the talking agent, and the internal activation, representing the listening agents’ atti-
tude: 
where extinputj is the final activation send out by the talking agent and intinputi is the 
internal activation of the listening agent.  When agents share the same attitude, the weight 
of the links between them is adjusted upwards.  If they disagree on an issue, the weights 
are adjusted downwards.  This is expressed mathematically as: 
where ext_al represents the external activation received (from the talking agent k) by the 
listening agent l and int_al the internal activation generated independently by the listen-
ing agent l; η is the rate by which the weights are adjusted.  When agents largely share 
the same attitude (i.e. the difference is below the Tolerance threshold), the links between 
them are strengthened.  Otherwise, the links between them are weakened.  This consti-
tutes an adaptive social process, in which agents learn from interacting with each other: 
Agents that consistently confirm each other’s attitudes will be connected by stronger 
links than agents that consistently disagree.  The social experience acquired in this way is 
represented in a distributed manner, in patterns of weighted links across the whole net-
work. 
3.4. Self-organization 
The cABM models social groups as non-linear, dynamical systems, in that we expect 
group and shared knowledge structures to emerge from social interaction through self-
organization of the constituent elements.  If the individual agents within the network re-
act in a consistent and coherent way to the information they receive from each other (in 
the form of activation spreading within the system), the cumulative effect of their local 
adjustments to their immediate environment will result in coordinated patterns at the 
group level. Connectionist systems lend themselves perfectly for modeling this type of 
self-organization process. Within the connectionist approach, both groups and individuals 
are seen as complex, dynamical systems that can be characterized by the connections 
between the constituent elements.  Applied to a group, the connections represent commu-
nication channels that allow the transmission of information and, through their adaptive 
nature, lead to coordinated action at the group level.  These networks have no central 
executive, but instead adapt through simple, local algorithms that adjust the connections 
between the constituent elements of the system.  Also, connectionist systems are known 




than others, in terms of the current information presented to a system and all prior infor-
mation embedded within the connections of that system.  Through the repeated applica-
tion of local learning algorithms, a connectionist network can be seen as self-organizing 
by moving towards an attractor state. Within the current framework, these attractor states 
are considered to be consensual group structures that incorporate all possible constraints 
within the system. 
4. Stereotyping and social influence 
I will first illustrate how the cABM can fit critical empirical patterns associated with ste-
reotyping, self-categorization and social influence.  A network structure is introduced 
that provides a cognitive mechanism that can account for these patterns. Agent networks 
are then embedded in an adaptive social network, to explore the impact of social interac-
tion.  
4.1. Empirical patterns 
As described in section 2, self-categorization theory essentially states that the percep-
tion an individual has of him or herself is context-dependent. In many contexts, self-
perception will focus on individual characteristics (i.e. “academic”, “spouse”, “musi-
cian”) that distinguish us from other individuals, providing us with a personal identity. 
Self-categorization at a group level occurs when a social identity is salient, which is de-
fined as  “[. . . ] that part of the individuals’ self- concept which derives from their 
knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and 
emotional significance attached to that membership.” [10]. When that occurs, an individ-
ual will self-stereotype in terms of an ingroup, which is a group with which an individual 
identifies, and which is differentiated from out-groups. For example, a group of Europe-
ans is more likely to categorize themselves as `European' (rather than as `French' and 
`Germans', say) in a situation where Americans and Asians are also present, rather than 
just other Europeans. This cognitive redefinition of the self is called depersonalization, or 
self-stereotyping in terms of an ingroup stereotype.  This phenomenon has been meas-
ured in a variety of ways, including open-ended measures that request the spontaneous 
listing of a person's self-attributes, to asking people to judge how typical they are of a 
group.  The consistent finding is that when the social self is salient, individuals reconfig-
ure their self representation to conform to the prototype of an ingroup, such that the self 
is viewed through the lens of the relevant ingroup  and is predominantly described in 
terms of traits or characteristics of that ingroup, rather than distinctive, individuating 
traits. Under those circumstances, individuals describe themselves as being more typical 
of an ingroup and less typical of an outgroup, as compared to when the personal self is 
salient. In addition, a number of studies seem to suggest that when the social self is sali-
ent, individuals are more open to social influence.  For instance, groups of individuals 
show more consensus in shared knowledge structures, such as stereotypes, when their 
interactions are framed in terms of a shared, social identity [17].  In the following simula-
tion, we will illustrate how the cABM provides a novel, alternative explanation of these 2 
critical  patterns: (1) self-categorization to a social self leads to more perceived similarity 
between self and ingroup, and more perceived differences with an outgroup; (2) social 
interaction predicated on that social self produces more consensus in stereotypes. 
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4.2. Theoretical assumptions and network structure 
At present, there is no detailed model of the mental representations or processes that 
might underlie the findings in this area.  Instead, self-categorization has been typically 
explained in terms of a metaphorical merging of self and other (i.e. an ingroup or out-
group member) representations. The connectionist approach makes the explicit assump-
tion that all mental representations are encoded and interconnected within the same net-
work, and that contextual cues determine which self-categorization takes place. This is 
reflected in the agent network structure in Figure 2: Representations of self and group 
stereotypes are distributed patterns of activations across a number of trait nodes. Because 
of its simplicity and ease of interpretability, a localist encoding is used, where each node 
represents a specific trait.  
Fig. 2.  Agent networks representing a personal self, ingroup, outgroup and social self stereotype  
 
There is no single node representing group membership or (personal or social) self per 
se.  Rather we assume that parts of the distributed pattern represent configurations of 
traits that are apparent through self-perception as cues to the personal self, whereas other 
parts represent traits that are perceived to be correlated with group membership. If the 
context primes information highly associated with the personal (i.e. unique traits) but not 
the social self (i.e. ingroup traits), representations close to (personal or social) self will be 
more strongly activated then those close to the ingroup.  Conversely, when, through the 
same process, characteristics of the ingroup dominate, self-categorization occurs more in 
terms of the ingroup stereotype.  This is essentially a socially situated approach to cogni-
tion, where the social context – which can represent a real-life social situation, an exper-
imental lab situation, or specific questions or manipulations by the experimenter – deter-
mines whether an individual self-categorizes mainly in terms of an ingroup stereotype (“I 
am a typical student”) or in terms of a personal self  (“I am not a typical student”).    
To achieve the network structures in Figure 2, a population of networks was trained 
with a series of patterns with information about the relationship between 5 traits 
(“ABCDE”). A set of patterns was constructed that associated attribute A & B, simulat-
ing a group of agents that define themselves mainly in terms of some configuration of 
these 2 attributes.  This represents the personal self of these networks. Another set of 
patterns was constructed that associated this personal self with either attributes CD or 
CE.  These associations define group membership, and networks were trained in such a 
way that they were either associated with group 1 (attributes CD) or 2 (attributes CE).  
Psychologically, this corresponds to a situation in which members from 2 social groups 
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develop stereotypical impressions of themselves and their groups. Through direct experi-
ences (observations of self and others) and indirect experiences (communication or ob-
servation of others' experiences), they develop expectancies about which traits character-
ize themselves and their ingroup, and how they set themselves and their groups apart 
from others. For instance, a group of students define themselves in terms of two unique 
attributes (AB), but also in terms of diligence (C) and intelligence (D) that are shared by 
many students in varying degrees (i.e. not all students are equally intelligent, but as a 
group they might believe that they are more intelligent than carpenters).  Similarly, a 
group of carpenters might define themselves in terms of a particular configuration of 
unique attributes (AB), but also in terms of diligence (C) and independence (E), but not 
so much intelligence (D).  
4.3. Testing the networks  
We simulate a self-categorization measure by testing our agent networks with 2 dif-
ferent cues or probes: (1) A personal self probe, in which both unique traits (AB) are 
maximally activated (i.e. a series of + 1.0); (2) a social self probe, in which one unique 
(A) and one group trait (C) are activated. Activation values are then allowed to flow 
through the network, and the extent to which the network activates the ingroup and out-
group nodes (either attribute C or E, depending on the group association) indicates the 
strength of association between an agent and these groups. Psychologically, this would 
correspond to asking an individual how typical she is of a particular group. Figure 3 
shows average simulated stereotypicality judgments for ingroup and outgroup in function 
of probe type. As would be expected, agent networks categorize themselves as more ste-
reotypical for ingroup than outgroup. Importantly, the figure shows that this is more so 
when networks are tested with a social probe.  In other words, if the context primes in-
formation highly associated with the social self, self-categorization occurs more in terms 
of the ingroup stereotypy, leading to more self-categorization. Figure 3 also shows that 
the difference between ingroup and outgroup stereotypicality is larger in the social as 
compared to the personal condition, reproducing the finding that differences between self 
and outgroup members are emphasized when an individual “depersonalizes” in terms of a 
social self. 
 
As mentioned, a number of studies have shown that social interaction produces more 
consensus in stereotypes when it is predicated on a shared social self or identity. Our 
agent-based implementation allows us to explore this process by simulating interaction 
between 2 groups of agents that involves a talking and listening phase during which all 
agents communicate with each other. An interaction involves a talking (or sending) and 
listening (or receiving) agent, and is completely determined by the equations introduced 
earlier. More specifically, external activation is provided to a talking agent (1), which 
generates internal activation within that agent (2, 4b). Communication then involves a 
listening agent receiving activation form a talking agent (6), which then generates inter-
nal activation within the listening agent (2, 4b). After the interaction, social adaptation 





Figure 4 shows stereotype consensus within each group of agents both Before and After 
simulated social interaction, and captures the finding that social interaction enhances 
consensus in ingroup stereotypes, and also that this effect is larger when individuals de-
personalize in the social probe condition [17]. 
4.4. Agent stereotype trajectories  
Because the model includes representations of individual cognitions (agent recurrent 
networks), it becomes possible to analyze how information that is communicated through 
the social system is adapted and integrated.  Each time an agent acquires information, it 
assimilates and adds its own personal experience (as captured by the long-term weights 
within an agent network) before sending its’ interpretation of the received information 
out again into the group.  One can think of this as a game of Chinese whispers:  Every 
member of the communication chain adds his or her own interpretation to the infor-
mation, leading to changes as the information proceeds down the communication chain.  
It is through this process that agents and the information they hold undergo a process of 
self-organization, whereby out of local interactions global, more consensual structures 
emerge. 
 
Fig. 3. Average simulated stereotypicality judgement in terms of ingroup and outgroup, and in function of 
probe type. Higher bars indicate more stereotypical judgments. Agent networks representing a personal self, 
ingroup, outgroup and social self stereotype 
Fig. 4. Average simulated stereotype consensus in function of social interaction. Higher bars indicate more consensus. 
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Fig. 5. The development of ingroup stereotypes  of 2 groups of 5 agents (i.e. “students” and “carpenters”) in 
function of social interaction.  Greater distance in opinion space represents greater difference between ingroup 
stereotypes. 
 
Figure 5 shows how agent ingroup stereotypes develop over the course of simulated so-
cial interaction for 2 groups of agents. Each agent position in the graph was determined 
by testing a network with a social self probe and measuring the extent to which it filled in 
the ingroup attribute (either E or D, depending on group membership). Networks that 
produce similar outputs are closer together, which conceptually represents similar catego-
rization in terms of an ingroup stereotype.  After each measurement networks interacted, 
after which they were probed again.  The figure shows that, as social interaction unfolds, 
the distance between the 2 groups becomes larger, illustrating how individual agents self-
organize in clusters of stereotypical similarity. The links within these clusters grow 
stronger, while links between them grow weaker.  Even though the set-up of this simula-
tion is relatively simple, the behavior of the agents shows remarkable similarities to well-
known social psychological processes: Agents organize themselves in clusters of agents 
that either agree (the ingroup) or disagree (the outgroup) on certain issues, and stronger 
connection weights between similar agents reflect increased social influence within such 
clusters.  The simulations show how the strengthening links between agents within a sin-
gle sub-cluster act as positive feedback loops that result in agents reinforcing each other’s 
attitudes.  This essentially leads to a group polarization effect (as apparent in the increas-
ing distance between opinion clusters), as the agents end up with more extreme opinions 
after the interaction, and also more consensual ingroup stereotypes.  This simulated pro-
cess thus shows strong similarities with the process through which real social groups cre-
ate, validate and maintain socially shared knowledge, and mimics how group member-
ship attenuates social influence: Agents are more likely to conform to other agents within 
the same cluster (the ingroup), because of the high mutual social influences within that 
cluster [5, 6]. 
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4.5. Dynamic network within and between agents. 
Before moving onto the empirical test of the model, I will use an example based on the 
design of the study below to illustrate the dynamic aspect of the connection weights both 
within and between agents. As mentioned, the weights of the connections between agents 
determine the influence agents have on each other. These weights are subjected to learn-
ing and change in almost exactly the same way as the internal weights of agent networks. 
Whereas internal weights encode an individual agents’ learning history, the external con-
nection weights encode the history of interactions between agents. Let’s take a simple 
interaction between 2 agents comparing information they have on a fictional “Group A” 
(see Figure 6).   
 
Fig. 6. The adjustment of inter-agent weights in communication between agents. Here, a talking agent expresses 
its opinion on the “Creativity” of the members of “Group A”. Because the expressed opinion of the talker and 
the private opinion of the listener are identical, it will lead to an increase of the relevant connection weights. 
 
Suppose both agents agree that members of Group A are relatively creative, which is 
encoded in the network of both agents by similar connection weights (.6) between the 
unit representing “Group A” and the unit representing the attribute “Creative”. An inter-
action between a talking (or sending) and listening (or receiving) agent proceeds accord-
ing to the equations introduced earlier: First, the “Group A” unit in the talker network is 
activated, by providing an activation of +1. This activation spreads internally to the “Cre-
ative” unit in proportion to the connection weight (.6) and results in an activation of .6 of 
that unit. When the Talking agent expresses its impression of Group A to the Listening 
agent, the activation of the “Group A” unit is transmitted to the Listener along the rele-
vant external connection, which initially has a default weight of .5.  As a result, the 
“Group A” unit in the listening network is activated (.5), and this activation spreads in-
ternally to the “Creative” unit in proportion to the connection weight (.6) and results in an 
activation of .3 of that unit. This internal activation is then compared to the correspond-
ing external activation received from the Talking agent. More precisely, the Creative unit 
within the talking network generates internal activation of .6, which is transmitted as ex-
ternal activation to the Listener network, in proportion to the weight of the external con-
nection (.5). The resulting external activating arriving at the Listener is .3.  In this case, it 
means the communication by the talking agent and the opinion of the listening agent are 
similar (.3). As a result, the connection weight between the Creative unit in the talking 
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and listening networks will increase in strength according to formula 8. However, as soon 
as the difference between external and internal activation exceeds the Tolerance thresh-
old, that weight will begin the decrease. As such, the relative agreement that agents de-
velop during interaction on particular topics, will be represented in the weights that ex-
ternally connect these topics between agents. 
5. Tolerance and Need for Closure 
Despite its central importance, only a few studies [17] have investigated the actual devel-
opment of consensual categories within real, interacting groups of participants.  This is 
partly due to the reluctance of psychological research to use the group as unit of analysis 
instead of the individual, but also to the complexity of the subject.  Interactions between 
even small groups of individuals result in complex patterns of reciprocal influences, in 
which actions of one individual can have non-linear implications for the whole social 
system.  Especially given the fluid nature of social categories, it would be impossible to 
derive precise predictions using existing verbal theories about the development of social-
ly shared categories in the course of social interaction.  The use of a computational model 
alleviates these problems, and allows making predictions of how processes working on 
different levels of a social system interact to produce emergent properties.    
5.1. Small group study 
Psychological research has identified a number of socio-cognitive variables that reflect 
individual differences in the willingness to deal with ambiguity in the social environ-
ment.  For instance, Need for Closure (NfC) reflects a desire for a quick and definitive 
answer to any question or decision rather than sustained uncertainty, confusion, or ambi-
guity [18].  We set out to test to what extend the Tolerance parameter in our model (see 
section 3.3) can simulate variation in social behavior caused by NfC, both in small group 
experiments and in larger collectives.  In cABM, the Tolerance parameter indicates the 
amount of difference in attitudes agents will allow before the links between them are 
weakened.  Our hypothesis was that high tolerance (agents accept large differences in 
attitudes) would correspond to low NfC, and vice versa.  This hypothesis was tested in a 
small group study. 
5.1.1. Subjects 
One hundred and fifty psychology undergraduate students (40 men, 110 women; mean 
age = 22.63) participated in the study as part of a class exercise.  Prior to the actual ex-
periment, all participants filled out a dispositional Need for Closure scale [18] in an ap-
parently unrelated session. 
5.1.2. Procedure 
Participants arrived in the lab and were informed that they would be receiving infor-
mation about individuals who belonged to one of two groups (Group A & B). They were 
asked to form an impression of these groups, and told that they would afterwards share 
their impressions with other participants. Based on their NfC score, participants were 
assigned in groups of three to either a High or Low NfC condition. Individual partici-
pants were then presented with written information describing members of the two 
groups in the form of statements (For instance, “I am finishing up my medical degree at 
Johns Hopkins in cardio-thoracic surgery. Before this, I received my doctorate from 
Cambridge in molecular biology. After working in the field, I decided to attend medical 
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school to become a surgeon.”). Crucially, some of the information about the groups was 
available to all group members (shared) whereas the remainder was distributed among 
group members (unique). More particularly, for both group A & B there were 4 critical 
attributes distributed across groups of three participants, so that each participant had one 
unique piece of information, and one piece of information was distributed across the 
three participants (see Table 1). For instance, participant 1 would learn that members of 
group A are sociable and intelligent, while participant 2 received information indicating 
that members of group A were sociable and creative. Because we wanted to study how 
the impressions of the group evolved during social interaction, this initial information did 
not associate either group strongly with any attribute. Participants read this information 
individually, and then indicated their impressions of the groups on a range of dependent 
measures.   
Table 1: Distribution of information across participants during individual phase 
Type of information: Shared  Unique 
Participants:   
1 A B 
2 A C 
3 A D 
Note. Information pertaining to 4 different traits (A, B, C, D) is distributed 
amongst groups of 3 participants, such that one trait (A) is shared, while the others 
(B-D) are “unique” to individual participants. 
Subsequently, participants were put together in groups of 3. An experimenter lead the 
group session. Each trial involved the experimenter reading out a statement describing 
the behavior of an individual (e.g. “We feel good when we are in the company of others” 
as an example of a sociable behavior) and then asking each participant for their judgment. 
Participants were instructed to indicate on a rating scale the degree to which they consid-
ered each statement to be representative of group A and B, and to read aloud the number 
they assigned (i.e. “Seven”). The order in which participants answered was randomized 
across trials. Twelve statements were presented for each critical attribute, totaling 48 
statements per group. At the end of the group interaction phase, participants were sepa-
rated and completed the same dependent measures they completed at the start of the pro-
cedure. On finishing the study, participants were debriefed and thanked for their partici-
pation.   
 
5.1.3. Data 
The basic idea behind this controlled methodology is to encourage individuals to learn 
from the classification behavior of others. At the end of the procedure, the categorization 
behavior of each individual group member can be conveniently represented by vectors.  
For instance, the perceived relationship between the attribute “friendly” and group A was 
assessed on 12 different occasions (i.e. participants rated on 12 occasions how typical 
someone behaving in a friendly manner was of group A). For each participant, this results 
in a 12 dimensional vector, where the separate components correspond to 12 different 
ratings given by that participant. By comparing these individual vectors within groups, 







The 2 top panels of Figure 7 show how in both NfC conditions, the cABM predicts that 
the variance in categorization within a group will become smaller, while stereotype 
strength will increase over the course of the experiment. The cABM also predicts that 
both consensualization and strengthening of the stereotype will be more outspoken in the 
Low NfC condition.  The bottom panels show that results largely confirmed cABM pre-
dictions: The left panel shows that the reduction in variance corresponded to the predict-
ed trend (Model fit: r= .8, p < .01).  Similarly, the cABM prediction regarding the 
strength of the stereotype was also confirmed, even though the model underestimated the 
intercept (Model fit: r= .72, p < .01):  As the experiment progressed, participants gradual-
ly reinforced each others categorizations, leading to essentially a polarization effect (i.e 
higher ratings on the scale).  As predicted, both effects were more outspoken in the Low 
NFC condition.   
Fig. 7. Top: cABM predictions for stereotype variance (left panel) and strength (right panel). Bottom: Corre-
sponding data form the small group study for stereotype variance (left panel) and strength (right panel).   
from studie  
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5.2. Further research 
By creating a community of networks, new parameters appear that are not present when 
we only consider an individual network. Table 1 lists cABM parameters, and their hy-
pothesized social psychological role. It is the nature of these parameters, and the nature 
of their relationship with features of real social groups, that are the focus of our empirical 
program.  Small group studies, like the one described above, allow us to validate and 
inform the most psychologically plausible values of these parameters.  For instance, our 
studies have shown that the variation in social behavior caused by individual differences 
in Need for Closure can be successfully simulated by allowing the Tolerance parameter 
to vary between approximately .25 (low tolerance, corresponding to high NfC) and .4 
(high tolerance, corresponding to low NfC). This provides us with a psychologically 
plausible range of values, which can be used to inform simulations of larger collectives, 
such as groups of employees in organizations.  
 
Although not addressed in the current paper, the cABM generates a number of predic-
tions about how dissonance between multi-dimensional attitudes affects the development 
of consensus. Surprisingly, this topic has received relatively little attention in social psy-
chological research, but there are a number of simulation models that have explored it. 
For instance, Huet and colleagues [19] demonstrated the impact of multi-dimensional 
attitudes on the development of conformity, using a model very similar to the cABM: 
Both models are build around a rejection mechanism determined by a tolerance parame-
ter, and both generate aggregate predictions consistent with self-categorization theory.  
The experimental design introduced in this paper could be adapted, for instance by 
providing information to participants that is inherently contradictory (i.e. Group A is both 
aggressive and peaceful). This would allow testing the predictions of the cABM, and to 
formally compare it with other simulations. 
   
In general, relevant psychological theories can be instantiated in cABM in a way that 
supports a process of probing and prediction.  In this process, simulations provide guid-
ance for empirical research as well as sufficient depth to support interactive modification 
of the underlying theory [1].  Using a computational model, we can create large sets of 
simulated social groups, each set having its own characteristics, which can then be put 
into a wide range of conditions. This represents a very efficient way of testing theoretical 
predictions in a simulated collective. Using this approach, we are currently exploring 
how large groups of employees within organizations develop a shared organizational 
identity, how that relates to a number  of critical socio-cognitive variables (for instance 
NfC), but also how the amount of social interaction, or the types of networks within or-
ganizations, affect this process.  
 
6. Comparison with other models. 
The study of social influence has received a substantial amount of attention in several 
disciplines. The cABM shares similarities with some of this work, and in particular with 
models that postulate mixes of assimilative and contrastive social influence. Much like 
the cABM, a number of models use a dynamic matrix of weights to represent how recip-
rocal social influence between individuals evolves over time [16, 20]. These models posit 
that individuals accept influence only from others whose current opinions are within a 
certain threshold distance from their own current positions.  Similarly, the class of “se-
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ceder” models postulate that people are motivated to seek distinctiveness when they are 
in company with others. Typically, every individual is assigned a particular attitude posi 
 
 
tion on a continuous scale, and then looks at randomly chosen others and selects the one 
whose attitude is the most different from the mean attitude within a particular comparison 
group.  All of these models are very consistent with self-categorization theory, and thus 
cABM. They all predict that individuals will move to the position of a deviant, noncon-
forming position but only in company with at least a few similar others. As such they 
combine an assimilative process, i.e. moving toward a chosen individual, with a contras-
tive process, moving toward the extreme and away from the mean. Although formal sim-
ulations are needed, it is likely that the predictions of these models of how groups can 
end up converging to a common opinion or split into several subgroups holding differing 
opinions, depending on the initial attitude distribution and the threshold for influence 
from others, are very similar.   
7. Conclusion 
The objects of psychological inquiry are complex systems that afford analysis at different 
levels of description. Our understanding of a given phenomenon gains explanatory power 
particularly when we can provide a causal account of it in terms of the entities and organ-
izing principles at a lower level of description than the phenomenon itself. Connectionist 
principles are cast at a lower level of description than the level of description that is ap-
propriate to describe their behavior, and bear no transparent relationship with the phe-
nomena that they are able to account for (i.e. self-categorization, social influence). There 
were current theorizing in psychology is very much couched in verbal, theoretical de-
scriptions, the connectionist perspective provides an account for complex social categori-
zation processes based on very simple, but powerful algorithms that mimic real memory 
processes. By developing a cognitive agent that implements basic self-categorization 
processes in terms of connectionist principles, and embedding such an agent within an 
adaptive network structure, we can start exploring macro level-consequences of the re-
cABM Knowledge structures Collective 
Network of agents  Social identity Social group, organization,  .. 
Interface: Self-categorization, consensualization 
Individual Recurrent 
Network  
Personal identity Individual knowledge 
structures  
Agent  Individual 
Local dynamics (Agent level) 
1. Pattern of connections within agent 
2. Pattern of activation within agent network 
3. External input to agent network 
4. Intra-agent Weight change rate 
 
Global dynamics (Group level) 
5. Patterns of connections between agents 
6. Connection weights between agents  
7. External input to group of agents 
8. Number of iterations 
9. Social Adaptation rule 
10. Inter-agent Weight Change Rate 
 
Context dynamics 
Affect all of the above 
Intragroup characteristics 
1. Schemata for phenomena (i.e. background theories) 
2. Current individual opinion, attitude, belief or attributes 
3. Access to environment (context, information) 
 4. Adaptive speed of agent. 
 
Group characteristics 
5. Communication structures, relations within group 
6. Identity-based and normative factors 
7. Distribution of information in small group 
8. Time (i.e. stage of group development) 
9. Reinforcement of consensus, diversity or a mixture 
10. Flexibility of group relations 
 
Context 
Group interdependence (competition, discrimination,..) 
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peated application of these processes, in parallel by many agents, within an artificial so-
cial system.  Such an integrated framework will allow investigating the interaction be-
tween memory (i.e. pattern learning and retrieval), individual (i.e. self-categorization) 
and group (social influence, communication) processes in fundamentally novel ways.   
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